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abstract
Theories of modernization, globalization, and dependency have assigned a 
clear role to Latin America: the region has been seen as dependent, exploited, 
and institutionally weak. In these theories, modernization and globalization 
are seen as forces generated elsewhere; the region, in these views, has merely 
tried to “adjust” and “respond” to these external influences. At best, it has 
imitated some of the political institutions of the core countries and, most of 
the times, unsuccessfully. While there is very good empirical evidence that 
supports these views, the essay argues that these theories need some correction. 
Latin America has been an innovator and a modernizer in its own right, 
especially in its cutting-edge design of the nation-state and in its modern 
conceptualization of the national community. Thus, the essay suggests that the 
region has not merely “adjusted” to modernization and globalization. Rather, 
the paper makes a case for a reinterpretation of the region’s role as a modernizer 
and an important contributor to the consolidation of the modern West. 
Key Words: Europe, globalization, Latin America, modernization, nation-
state, United States. 
resumen
Las teorías de la modernización, globalización y dependencia han asignado un 
papel claro a América Latina: la región se ve como dependiente, explotada e 
institucionalmente débil. En dichas teorías, la modernización y la globalización 
se miran como fuerzas generadas desde fuera de la región. Así, América 
Latina solamente ha tratado de “ajustarse” y “responder” a esas influencias 
externas. Cuando más ha imitado algunas instituciones políticas de los países 
centrales y, en la mayoría de los casos, con poco éxito. Si bien existe evidencia 
empírica para sustentar aquellas perspectivas, este artículo argumenta 
que ellas necesitan ser revisadas. América Latina ha sido innovadora y 
modernizadora en sus propios términos, especialmente en el crucial tema 
de la construcción del Estado-nación y en su conceptualización moderna de 
la comunidad nacional. Por tanto, el artículo sugiere que la región no se ha 
limitado a “ajustarse” a la modernización y a la globalización. Por el contrario, 
en estas páginas se insiste en la reinterpretación del papel de la región como 
modernizadora y en su importante contribución al Occidente moderno.
Palabras clave: América Latina, Estado-nación, Estados Unidos, Europa, 
globalización, modernización.
m o d e r n i z a t i o n  t h e o r y  r e V i s i t e d :  l a t i n  a m e r i c a ,  e u r o p e ,  a n d  t h e  u . s . . . .
[245]
a n u a r i o  c o l o m b i a n o  d e  h i s t o r i a  s o c i a l  y  d e  l a  c u l t u r a  *  V o l .  3 8 ,  n . º  1  *  2 0 1 1  *  i s s n  0 1 2 0 - 2 4 5 6
m odernization, david apter surmised in the late 1960s, is “(…) a special kind of hope. Embodied within it are all the past revolu-
tions of history and all supreme human desires. The modernization 
revolution is epic in its scale and moral in its significance. Its consequences 
may be frightening. Any goal that is so desperately desired creates political 
power, and this force may not always be used wisely or well.”1 Apter was of 
course referring to 1960s expansion of capitalist development, from core to 
periphery. Like many other modernization theorists of his time, he thought 
of modernity as the spread of Western influence, from North America and 
Western Europe to the rest of the world. 
What did modernity mean? Several indicators were listed: the develop-
ment of an industrial advanced sector, the breakdown of peasant economies, 
the spread of wage labor, urbanization, the pace of economic development, 
the capacity of countries to generate savings, and the emergence of more 
open and democratic forms of rule. Core countries generated most of it; 
developing countries adjusted. Was this representation accurate? Latin 
America shows that it is not. Important institutional developments associ-
ated with modernity were also part of this picture but were not given as 
high a status: the relation between nation and state (needed to construct the 
nation-state category), and the modern characteristics of national identity. 
As we shall see, in this last sense Latin America made a solid contribution 
to modernity. 
Work on culture, gender, and identity has challenged definitions of devel-
opment and modernization, but our thinking about the spread of modernity 
and globalization has not substantially changed. Since the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century, literature has depicted a causality that goes from 
an industrialized and more developed core to the “peripheries”. The same has 
been claimed of “civilization”, another fuzzy term associated with the expan-
sion of the modern West. It can be argued that already in the 15th century 
Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic Spanish monarchs, wanted to civilize the 
Indies.2 Thus, development, modernity, and civilization have been conceived 
as spreading from Western Europe and North America to the rest, from first 
1. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1965) 1.
2. For great insights into this characterization of the Indies by the Kings and first 
conquerors, see Hugh Thomas, Rivers of gold: the Rise of the Spanish Empire; 
from Columbus to Magellan (New York: Random House, 2004).
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modernizers to late modernizers, from industrial to less industrial, from su-
perior cultures that encouraged entrepreneurship, technological innovation 
and economic achievement, to others that did not and, thus, lagged behind. 
The Europe-Latin America connection, during and after the colony, 
became the main independent variable in theories of Latin American devel-
opment and modernity. As has been amply documented, colonialism made 
the region dependent, debt-ridden, and vulnerable. It was Marxist literature 
that made one of the most radical arguments from this perspective. Latin 
America was seen as a byproduct of Europe and, for better or for worse, of 
Spain, with its scarce capitalist development and accumulation. The region 
was said to have inherited the European feudal mode of production. Class 
struggle took place in the context of protracted feudalism. With no indus-
trial revolution to speak of, Latin America’s modernity was structurally 
hampered from the start. Influential Marxists such as Mariátegui in Peru or 
Puiggros in Argentina claimed so, generating a whole body of scholarship.3 
While the “material basis” of the feudal lords in the new and the old world 
differed —mines, haciendas, and “encomiendas” characterized the new— the 
economic structure and relations of production could still be called feudal. 
Spain was feudal; its colonies should also be.4 These conclusions allow little 
room for regional originality and ignore the whole cultural and institutional 
innovation of the postcolonial context. 
Arguments about globalization are, in many respects, similar to old 
arguments about modernization.5 Amartya Sen, for instance, has described 
the controversy about globalization in a way that is reminiscent of debates 
about modernity: 
(…) those who take an upbeat view of globalization see it as mar-
velous contribution of Western civilization to the world (…) the great 
developments happened in Europe: first came the Renaissance, then the 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and that lead to a massive 
3. José Carlos Mariátegui, Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana 
(Lima: Editorial Amauta, 1952); Rodolfo Puiggros, De la Colonia a la Revolución 
(Buenos Aires: Partenon, 1949).
4. For a very good critique of these arguments, see Milciades Peña, Antes de Mayo 
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones Fichas, 1970).
5. For a discussion on Latin America as a “globalizer” rather than as a passive 
actor in the contemporary world, see Fernando Lopez-Alves and Diane 
Johnson, Globalization and Uncertainty in Latin America (London: McMillan, 
2007). Introduction and chapter 1.
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increase in living standards in the West. And now the great achieve-
ments of the West are spreading to the World (…) From the opposite 
perspective Western dominance —sometimes seen as a continuation of 
Western imperialism— is the devil of the piece (…) The celebration of 
various non Western identities, defined as religion (…) region (…) or 
culture can add fuel to the fire of confrontation with the West.6 
These views, as Sen also points out, are, of course, limited to specific 
historical periods and spaces. If one goes back ten centuries, one finds a 
different flow of globalization at work. Dissemination went from East to 
West, from China, India and the Middle East, to Europe. It was only after 
the eleventh century that the current paradigm emerged. Up until now it 
continues to be valid. Latin America, however, introduces important recti-
fications in terms of its timing, lines of causality, and contexts. 
My point is that in both modernization and globalization theories, re-
gardless of the inspiration, Latin America has been seen as “reacting” and 
“adjusting” to forces originating elsewhere. Leftists, liberals, and conser-
vatives alike have coincided in viewing the region as the latest and most 
important trench against globalization. It has been said that in the “ongoing 
war of resistance” the region is one of the last important bastions, fighting 
globalization both from above and below. While these claims are not com-
pletely wrong, they are simplistic. They, among other things, have plainly 
ignored the contribution of Latin America to modernity and the expansion 
of what literature has usually called “the modern West”
What was that particular contribution? 
1) An alternative to European and North American institutional models 
regarding the connection between the state and the nation. The “state” in 
Latin America tried to “make” the nation in its entirety, rather than the 
other way round. This particular connection has been, to my mind, mostly 
overlooked. A basic reason for this neglect is that, for the most part, literature 
on the formation of the nation-state in Latin America and elsewhere has 
focused on the state but ignored the nation part of this equation. 
2) The implementation, from the onset of nation-state building, of the 
modern one state-one nation formula. Latin American nation-states emerged 
from a model that tried to attach an in-the-making nation to an in-the-
making state. In other words, nation builders subscribed to, at the time, 
6. Amartya Sen, “How to Judge Globalism”, The American Prospect 13.1 (2002).
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a popular modern notion: one nation to each state, and one state to each 
nation. That is, unlike the European and Asian experiences, each state was 
supposed to rule over one nation rather than over many. And, following 
the rise of modern nationalism in Europe, Latin America believed that each 
sovereign nation should be represented by its own state. 
3) An innovative conception of the national community that tried to 
unite members by stressing an open —and uncertain— future as one of the 
most important factors in the conceptualization of the nation. This runs 
counter to what most literature on nation building and nationalism has 
stressed as a binding factor among members of the nation: the importance 
of the past, common history, and traditions.
As we shall see, in Latin America, the nation-state was structured under 
the guidelines of republicanism, which was quickly adopted by most of the 
region. In Europe, this model became dominant only after World War I. 
And it was only by the mid-twentieth century that we find it as a dominant 
model in Central Asia and Africa, at a time in which postcolonial states 
struggled to integrate different ethnicities, tribal rivalries, and religious dif-
ferences into a modern unifying version of the nation and the state. Whether 
this was a better institutional choice or not for Latin America, or whether 
modernity is better than other political and social arrangements, is not my 
concern here. I want only to make the case that Latin America created its 
own modernity, and that this can be seen in the particular model of the 
nation state and republican rule that the region developed. 
In the rest of this essay, I will succinctly make the case for Latin America 
as a modernizer rather than as a mere receptor of modernity. I will do so 
by, first, offering a brief comparative overview of nation-building in Latin 
America, Europe, and the United States. Second, I will try to summarily 
discuss the particular contribution of Latin America to a wider and global 
process of nation-making that spanned the eighteenth, nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. 
Modernity and the Nation
Modernity includes more than economic development. It is also the 
creation of institutional modular arrangements that can be transferred and 
imported from one region in the global system to another. Industrialization 
and modern economic financial structures can be bettered and encouraged 
but they cannot be totally exported. Institutions can. Thus, the structural 
paradox of Latin America, pointed out long ago by dependency theorists 
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like Cardoso and Faletto: modern institutions (parties, unions, party sys-
tems, nation-states) long endured and functioned with different degrees of 
autonomy but in less developed contexts.7 
Very importantly, modernity is also about the creation and evolution of 
imaginaries. In this regard, Latin America represents one of those special 
intersections of the post-colonial where different images of power connected 
to the global and the local met, and where border thinking filtered different 
imageries of modernity. These images of modernity were strongly connected 
with ideas about the desired “national community”, with a debate as to what 
should unite individuals and peoples under the same “nation”, and with for-
mulae as to how to create needed bonds between governments and citizens. 
What I want to stress here is that from around 1810 to the early 1900s, among 
other things, conceptualizations of the nation and its future, both desired 
and real, became crucial blocks in the construction of the nation-state. 
Discussing modernity in connection to nation-building does not mean 
that one needs to adopt a Eurocentric or North American perspective.8 In-
deed, Latin American modernity included subaltern views and cultures as 
much as it did racism, violence, and dualism.9 Traditional historiography  has 
correctly stressed the importance of the possible options that faced the new 
elites in power after independence. Some of them were conducive to trying 
to imitate either Europe or the United States. The result was a mixture of Cre-
ole, indigenous, and foreign influences: “Hispanoamérica miró a sí misma y 
recuperó el modelo político hispano-criollo, de raíz medieval e igualitaria. 
Miró a Inglaterra y a Francia, cuyos regímenes políticos derivaban de sendas 
revoluciones (…) Y miró a Estados Unidos, el único caso en el que el mov-
imiento democrático y republicano se había dado junto con un movimiento 
7. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development 
in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
8. Some have done so. Despite the limitations of Eurocentric views they have 
nonetheless make a solid contribution. See for instance, Francois-Xavier 
Guerra, Modernidad e independencias: ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas 
(Madrid: Mapfre, 1992).
9. For an argument about the importance of subaltern views and the need to 
include them in studies of the Latin American state, see Florencia Mallon, 
“Decoding the Parchments of the Latin American Nation State: Peru, Mexico, 
and Chile in Comparative Perspective”, Studies in the Formation of the Nation 
State in Latin America, ed. James Dunkerley (London: Institute of Latin 
American Studies / University of London, 2002) 13-54.
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emancipador”.10 These choices and their mixtures notwithstanding, toward the 
end of the nineteenth century most of the region had created its own version of 
modernity. Almost the entire region opted for republican rule and slowly but 
surely accepted party competition and elections, closer to the modern North 
American model than to any other, but not exactly identical. Those who did 
not, like Venezuela, after the fall of Juan Vicente Gomez nonetheless evolved 
into electoral politics and a more modern design of the state. Mexico and the 
Mexican revolution provide a well-known exception that confirms the rule. 
State makers adopted a modern notion of legitimacy that differed from 
that of Europe and the United States. Nations were conceived and built at the 
post-colonial crossroads of cultures, global influences, modern liberal think-
ing, and colonial backgrounds of dependence, resistance, and negotiation. 
Images and conceptualizations of “the nation” were bound to incorporate 
bits and pieces of all this process and the imaginary of indigenous, ethnic 
and immigrant communities. While most literature agrees that subaltern 
notions of the nation survived at the margins of “official” definitions pro-
moted by the state, in official conceptualizations and imagining of the nation 
much of the subaltern was also incorporated. Total exclusion was attempted 
but failed; in the end, those excluded nonetheless impinged some of their 
imaginary of modernity and the nation upon the “official” definitions of 
the national community promoted by the state. 
 Europe and Latin America
A comparative overview of Latin America and Europe supports the 
notion that the region made its own contributions to the expansion of mo-
dernity and “the West”, rather than being a mere imitator of influences 
coming from elsewhere. In Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, “nations”, 
in the traditional sense of the word, possessed long and rich histories. Long 
before the modernizing sixteenth century, they constituted part of the Eu-
ropean landscape. Most of them lived, for centuries, under the ruling of the 
same state, e.g., empires, protectorates, or kingdoms. As Charles Tilly and 
others argued many times, the advent of the modern world marked a shift 
toward the emergence of smaller states. Such states tended to rule over fewer 
nations. The one state-one nation formula, however, remained more the 
exception than the rule for a long time. Latin America adopted this model 
10. José Luis Romero, Situaciones e ideologías en América Latina (Medellín: 
Editorial Universidad de Antioquia, 2001) 107.
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shortly after independence and established its preeminence in a whole region 
before Europe did likewise. Europeans for sure did not see modernity in 
Latin America. And as far as North Americans were concerned, the region 
remained a mix of barbarism and republicanism. Yet, looked at from the 
point of view of comparative political analysis and bearing in mind other 
less developed regions of the world, Latin America represented much more 
than that. It represented another model of modernity.
True, the new states were, by European standards, weak.11 Such weakness, 
however, did not make their agendas less modern. The encouragement of 
patriotism and the construction of national identity, for instance, appeared 
as top priorities in the agenda of the new republican states. No question that 
pre-modern states (like the Elizabethan state, for instance) behaved similarly 
to modern states in a number of counts. For instance, they made strong ef-
forts to “consolidate patriotic feeling”.12 Since the late seventeenth century 
European states resorted to all means at their disposal to inculcate strong 
patriotism and nationalism, waging “patriotic” wars on one another.13 At 
first sight, one seems to find something similar in nineteenth century Latin 
America. A closer look, however, detects something qualitatively different. 
Pre-modern states did not prioritize the creation of consensus about the 
“national character” or the characteristics of the nation upon which they 
were to rule. Contrastingly, Latin American state makers took these matters 
very seriously. States in Latin America also showed interest in encouraging 
patriotism, but at the same time they worried about achieving consensus re-
garding the cultural and physical characteristics of the national community. 
The development of the nation-state paralleled an emphasis on patriotism 
and nationalism. It also worked at post-colonial definitions and imaginings 
of the “national community”. And the new states definitely strived much 
more thoroughly to implement the modern one nation-one state formula.
In Europe, older, pre-modern and stronger states could traditionally 
rule over many nations. These nations were many indeed. 
11. See Fernando Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); see as well a similar argument in 
Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin 
America (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2002).
12. Peter Mandler, The English National Character: The History of an Idea from 
Edmund Burke to Tony Blair (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) 14-15.
13. Patriotism and nationalism are basically understood as the defense of what is 
“ours” against what is “foreign”. 
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The ratio between these nations and existing states was heavy on the 
side of nations. That is, few states were able to rule over many nations. Na-
tions were bounded by shared ethnicities, culture, common histories, and 
geographical location. Armies, taxation systems, and bureaucracies bound 
states. Nations epitomized strong political and social actors that were able 
to survive amalgamation into empires and large states. In nineteenth cen-
tury Europe, size was part of the definition of a nation. It was argued that 
small nations had much to gain by merging into bigger ones. Strong states 
embodied the conduit by which these mergers could take place. Multiethnic 
and multiracial nations became, therefore, unavoidable. The nation/state 
had to become, by force, nationally heterogeneous. Europe, diverse and rich 
in nationalities (figure 1), had no choice but to form multinational nations. 
Otherwise, it would evolve into what was perceived as a hopeless “small 
nation model”, that is, a continent defined by nations of Lithuanians, Mol-
davians, Basques, etc. Large territories and abundant populations provided 
the clue for the success of a large and strong “Nation” actually composed 
of many smaller “nations” under the administration of one well-built state. 
In Latin America, the “strong nation” model was also popular. Yet na-
tion makers relied on weaker institutions, and thus, a unified nation where 
multiethnic and racial differences could be avoided or eliminated altogether 
seemed to be a more viable model. From their standpoint, in addition to 
racism and prejudice, the survival of indigenous nations triggered fear. The 
idea of many nations living under one state was perceived as a recipe for 
conflict. They saw strength in homogeneity rather than in heterogeneity. In 
the imaginary of modernity, conflict among nations was the source of much 
evil and ought to be avoided. Indeed, for some, it was up to modernity to 
eliminate nations altogether. The reasons were obvious: many contempo-
raries looked at strong national feeling as one of the most important causes 
of war.14 So, weak Latin American states feared the eruption of internal wars 
caused by conflict among nations and sought to avoid it. 
Thus, for the most part, Latin American states were able to block Native 
American nations from having political representation in the new states. 
Indeed, with different degrees of success, they tried to avoid the one state-
many nations situation at all costs. On the one hand, Liberalism fostered 
the combination of Republican rule with the one state-one nation formulae; 
14. See, for instance, The New York Times [New York] 11 Jul. 1895: and The New York 
Times [New York] 17 Aug. 1902: 1. 
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this was taken seriously. On the other, modernity’s prescription —to each 
state its own nation, to each nation its own state— seemed more convenient 
for weaker states, such as the republics of Latin America. It represented a 
more manageable system: one in which new rulers could centralize power 
and construct legitimacy by relying upon one dominant national identity. 
Similarly to what occurred in Europe, however, and despite all the killings, 
slavery, and elimination of Native Americans, in Latin America multiethnic 
and multiracial “Nations” could not be completely avoided. With the (very 
relative) exception of a few lands of recent settlement (Argentina, Uruguay, 
Costa Rica) whose cities were populated by a majority of Europeans, the 
rest of the region had to accommodate large numbers of people representing 
different cultures, races, and ethnicities. 
Lord Acton once argued that nations became stronger when possessing 
different centers of power represented by different nationalities and cultures: 
“A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a 
state which labors to neutralize, to absorb or expel them, destroys it own 
vitality; a state who does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of 
self-government.”15 His argument did not take roots in Latin America. Only 
slowly did the Latin American nation state acknowledge diversity. When 
in the twentieth century it did so, it perceived it as something that needed 
to be integrated into a larger and stronger “national culture”. This explains 
the policies that states designed from the onset to reduce the influence and 
physical presence of undesired groups (African Americans, Indigenous 
populations) by marginalization and extermination. We know that immigra-
tion policy was used to “purify” the population as well. As has been amply 
documented, the Argentinean, Uruguayan, Peruvian, and Brazilian states 
aggressively encouraged immigration of the desired “races”. At many points 
in its development- Colombia tried to do the same. One can argue that all 
these tensions were associated with the imposition of a modern model of 
nation making. A modern landscape of nation-states did emerge in the re-
gion. Most of them instituted policies aimed at creating their desired nation. 
Figure 2 pictures the very early rise (1830) of a number of nation-states in 
Latin America, some of them already republics. A few of the new states are 
still missing in this picture, which represents post-colonial Latin America 
right after independence. As has often been said, this political map has 
15. Quoted in Omar Dahbour and Micheline Ishay, The Nationalism Reader (New 
Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995) 117.
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experienced only a few alterations to the present day. Colonial possessions 


















South America in 1830. Perry Castaneda, Library Map Collection, University of Texas, 
Austin. Available in http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/map_sites/hist_sites.html
Therefore, Europe and Latin America can be said to represent very different 
and yet complementary processes of nation-state formation and modernity, 
both belonging to the West. Europe was definitely more “modern” in terms of 
economic development, patterns of centralization of authority, organization 
of bureaucracies, educational systems, and the development of science and 
technology. Latin America represented a modern, yet different experience in 
terms of the emergence of nation-states at an earlier time in conjunction with 
globalization, and the development of polities that, from scratch, accepted 
the notion that the state could craft the characteristics of a unifying nation. 
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None of the Latin American republics seriously thought of reproduc-
ing European models of rule. Europe was mentioned, dreamed, imagined, 
fantasized, criticized, and many times praised. At the same time, there ex-
isted a solid awareness that it could not really be “copied”. The u.s. did offer 
useful examples in terms of concrete policies of immigration, agricultural 
development, constitutional amendments, etc. But nobody really seriously 
considered that the United States could be reproduced down south either. 
We should not forget either that, in the eyes of Latin American republics, 
most of Europe did not just represent modernity: it also embodied monar-
chical rule, colonialism, and archaic institutions. Regarding the United 
States, most Latin American nation makers viewed the First Republic as 
a model worth imitating; President Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina has 
been often cited as a well-known example of admiration for the u.s. model 
of nation building. Yet, as we shall see, the United States was also perceived 
as too different a republican experience from that of Latin America, with 
its emphasis on religious communitarian values, land grant policies, a code 
of communal laws inherited from the Tudors, and a Federal system that at 
mid-nineteenth century seemed too difficult to reproduce in different Latin 
American regions. 
 The Incorporation of “the Masses” 
on Both Sides of the Atlantic
Both the Old and New Worlds confronted the task of “accommodating 
the masses” into politics and creating identity. Since the eighteenth century 
“the nation” that elites and government tried to construct was designed, in 
part, to keep the masses at bay. But in the end the “masses” had to be inte-
grated. In the late 1920s Ortega y Gasset argued that modernity made “the 
people” believe that it was sovereign: “To this day, the ideal has been changed 
into a reality, not only in legislation (…) but in the heart of every individual 
(…) To my mind, anyone who does not realize this curious situation of the 
masses, can understand nothing of what today is beginning to happen in 
the world.”16 In heterogeneous new societies like those of Latin America 
—as was also the case in the United States, Australia, and Canada— the 
construction of national identity was forced to deal, from the onset, with 
the aspirations of “the masses”. State formation was shaped by pressures to 
16. José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: w.w. Norton & 
Company, 1932) 23.
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accommodate the masses into a republican model of power centralization. 
This had advantages and disadvantages. 
European states, bearers of long established traditions, seemed less 
free to innovate than the new republics. Rulers in Latin America, in a 
vacuum of established glorious traditions that would fit the new republics, 
appeared freer to innovate. The result was that they mixed a number of 
colonial practices with liberal republican institutions of government and 
a number of foreign influences, both from outside (from the international 
system) and from inside the nation (immigrants). Yet this freedom to in-
novate and choose from possible types of regimes remained more limiting 
in Latin America than in Europe. European states, stronger and possess-
ing well-established traditions that glorified rulers, political institutions, 
and national histories could resort to past glories and heroes and thus opt 
from a wider arrange of possible models of government. Even as late as 
the nineteenth century the return of monarchy, empire, colonialism, and 
other forms of traditional aristocratic rule remained a possibility and a 
reality (France, Austria, Germany, Italy, etc). After the 1850s, liberal and 
socialist doctrines were popular in intellectual and political thinking 
as well, and many in Europe feared that the advent of the masses into 
politics would bring about a sort of wild socialism or communism able 
to undermine the status quo. 
In Latin America, practically the opposite was true. To the question of 
modern democracy, republican rule, monarchy, socialism, or imperialism, 
the region had but one answer: modern liberal republics. Mexico of course 
debated it, and similar controversies can be found across the region. And 
yet, again, shortly after independence most countries adopted republican 
rule and constitutional regimes. In a way, Francis Fukuyama’s argument 
of “the end of history” could apply here. Most ruling elites considered that 
republican rule and some sort of participatory political system was their only 
available alternative. Of course pro-colonial and monarchical factions did 
emerge in Latin America. But, unlike those in Europe, they did not possess 
the power to establish monarchical regimes. Rather, in most of the continent 
the new ruling elites claimed to exercise power in the name of change and 
newness, rather than in the name of “pre-modern forms of rule”. In terms 
of monarchical and imperial rule, there surely existed honorable indigenous 
precedents. But when General San Martin argued that perhaps the best thing 
for the new emerging polities was to rescue a Latin American royal tradition 
(as opposed to borrowing it from Europe) and thus to elect an Inca Emperor 
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as a supreme ruler, his proposal provoked utter rejection.17 Not surprisingly, 
in a postcolonial context, Europeans were considered a superior race and the 
adoption of an Inca Dynasty, as a source of royal legitimacy seemed utterly 
unacceptable. As the assembly put it, to revert to an “inferior Indian royal 
house” was deemed backwards and against modernity. 
 Another aspect of the process of incorporation of the “masses” into the 
nation-state that differentiated Europe from Latin America —and which 
points to Latin American modernity— was the type of incorporation. On 
both shores of the Atlantic, elites and the emerging middle classes shared 
a number of concerns about the ascent of the populace as an actor in the 
process of decision-making. In Europe, many believed that the mob was tak-
ing over the politics of their time.18 During the early 1900s the same feeling 
spread through Latin America. Similarly to the current situation, in Europe, 
at the time, it was believed that the “ghosts” of “the crowd” and “the “masses” 
represented a serious threat to European culture.19 Somewhat similarly, 
in the new republics of Latin America, elites felt besieged by indigenous 
peoples, Africans, and the urban and rural poor. Progressives and liberals 
on both sides of the Atlantic saw it differently: the masses represented the 
glorious armies of proletarians and peasants defending self-determination 
and progress. Thus, urban crowds seemed to symbolize, at the same time, 
the most dangerous manifestations of modern life and a source of promise 
and inspiration. 
These crowds were present in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Mexico, 
and Colombia. In the region as a whole, weak states faced demands from 
below. The rank and file of political parties, guerrilla-type groups, and dis-
sident regional leaders could often threaten the state. In Europe, these threats 
were not as powerful. Thus, in Latin America demands coming from lo-
17. Very likely, that was San Martin’s intention because his goal was to promote 
republican rule over any other kind of government. His proposal tilted the 
Congress in his favor.
18. For a detailed discussion in reference to fascism and National Socialism, see 
George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass 
Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich (New 
York: Howard Ferting, 1975) 4-6. 
19. Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern 
Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989) 66-69; Paul Johnson, Modern 
Times: The World from the Twentieths to the Nineties (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1983).
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cal caudillos and the lower classes, as well as the evolving pacts between 
the central power and rebellious forces were incorporated into the institu-
tions of the state and the conceptualization of the nation.20 Unlike Europe, 
this characterized the formation of the modern republican state from the 
beginning. Therefore, the institutional vehicle of incorporation (stronger 
monarchies and larger states in Europe, weak republics in Latin America) 
separated the two worlds.
In some regions of Latin America like the River Plate, where indigenous 
populations were less numerous, prior identities were weakened either by 
war, displacement, or genocide. In Colombia, we find a similar situation in 
many ways. Unlike Europe, elites had to create a new sense of belonging. In 
heterogeneous societies whose inhabitants remained deeply divided along 
racial, ethnic, and class lines, and where large contingents of immigrants 
kept their allegiance to foreign nationalities, elites needed to create some 
sort of national identity to build legitimacy. Here, Europe also experienced 
something different, not because states did not house immigrants from 
distant regions of the continent, but because of much smaller sheer numbers. 
Europe and Latin America shared a similar conceptualization of the na-
tion in that “the nation” was conceived as representing a defined hierarchy. 
In Latin America, horizontal camaraderie, as defined especially by Benedict 
Anderson, was hardly a part of the imagining of the national community. 
The nation was going to be status and class- oriented. In both Latin America 
and  North America, race remained an unresolved issue from the begin-
ning. In Europe, ethnicity, religion, and race also represented obstacles to 
integration into a “nation”. In both Europe and Latin America, the “emo-
tional attachment” that united people to their nations depended upon race, 
ethnicity, status, and class. Europe differed from Latin America on this 
score, since in Latin America those who were disenfranchised by race and 
ethnicity constituted the majority of the population in most of the region. 
As has often been remarked, another very important difference with 
the European scene was that by the 1890s and beyond, Latin American na-
tions were, for the most part, not strong enough to wage war on neighbors. 
Therefore, these nations were described, perceived, and imagined in dif-
ferent ways from those in which Europeans defined theirs. As in Europe, 
many members of the ruling elites of Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela or 
20. For a more expanded discussion of this topic, see Lopez-Alves, State Formation, 
introduction and conclusion. 
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Mexico envisioned some kind of colonial expansion. In their own eyes and 
also in the perception of Europeans, this would have elevated the status of 
their nations. In practice, however, Latin American states remained unable 
to expand by war and conquest.21 
Both in Europe and Latin America nationalism was perceived as a grow-
ing problem. Because in Argentina and Uruguay, for instance, most urban 
dwellers were foreigners or first-generation creoles, the new republican 
states perceived the upsurge of European nationalism as directly affecting 
their urban masses. They worried about Italian immigrants who wanted to 
remain Italian rather than adopting the Argentine or Uruguayan nation-
alities, Spaniards who wanted to remain Spaniards, Polish who wanted 
to remain Polish, and Middle Eastern immigrants who kept allegiance to 
Syria, Armenia, or Turkey. In other Latin American countries with less 
urbanization or fewer immigrant populations,   the masses of “backward” 
Native Americans, the rural poor, and dispossessed peasants who, by the 
end of the century had started to migrate to the capital cities, also inspired 
awe and fear in the eyes of the ruling coalitions. They were perceived, as in 
Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, or Ecuador, as challengers of the desired equation 
of one nation-one government. In Europe we can find similar scenarios: in 
Italy, for instance, backward peasants from the south who joined the more 
advanced North provoked fears of secession and revolution.22 Yet, Europe, 
with modern states in place and national armies fully developed, could more 
comfortably absorb or repress diversity and dissidence than Latin America. 
Latin American Modernity
Since the mid-nineteenth century, a negative image of the region was 
installed both in the European and Latin American imaginaries. These im-
ages, based on some hard facts, placed Latin America far away from moder-
nity. Insecurity and war were major concerns. In Mexico, “Esta pestilencia 
de los ladrones que infesta a la República nunca ha podido ser extirpada 
(...) con el pretexto de expulsar a los españoles esas partidas armadas in-
vaden los caminos entre Veracruz y la capital (…) arruinando el comercio 
21. For a comparative argument on the weakness of the state in Latin America, see 
Centeno, Blood and Debt; and Lopez-Alves, State Formation.
22. See Jared Becker, Nationalism and Culture: Gabriele D’Annunzio and Italy after 
the Risorgimento (New York: Peter Lange Editor, 1994).
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y haciendo caso omiso de la opinión pública y la ley de 1824 (…)”23 While 
banditry in Mexico has been considered to be the most widespread and 
resilient, in the rest of the region the rural poor and landless peasants also 
made their way, as they could, into banditry to escape authority and prior 
exploitation; this process lingered until the beginning of the 20th Century. 
Bandits in Colombia, as has been documented, became an integral part of 
the political landscape.24 
In 1865, ont the other end of the continent, the Spanish Consul in Mon-
tevideo also reported that chaos and insecurity reigned in the River Plate 
and beyond. “Since their foundation (the Consul argued) (...) these counties 
have been at war and have enjoyed only brief peace (all of which) provokes 
in all the social classes mistrust and apathy, and in all sectors of the econo-
my, commercial stagnation.”25 The Consul was not alone. Others, however, 
blamed the backwardness of Latin America precisely on the heritage of the 
country he represented. Looking at Paraguay in the late 1890s, for instance, 
a North American reporter concluded that only foreign influence from 
other European countries —rather than Spain— could make a difference: 
“Whatever material advance this country may make in the future, will be 
mainly due to foreigners who are rapidly crowding in. The ubiquitous gentle-
men from the north of Italy is already present in relatively large numbers, 
and the enterprising German is becoming alive to the good pastures of the 
Rio Alpa (…) The Paraguayan is an indolent being whose needs are simple 
and easily supplied.” Yet Spanish culture, in fact, seemed to be even more 
damaging than indigenous traditions and values: “Crime is comparatively 
rare in Paraguay, and the majority of the bad Guaraníes are to be found in 
the Argentine, with the evil characteristics of the sixteenth century Spaniard 
and his composition.”26 
23. Letter by Marquesa de Calderon de la Barca, 1841, cited in José Luis Romero, 
Latinoamérica: las ciudades y las ideas (Medellín: Editorial Universidad de 
Antioquia, 1999) 215.
24. Gonzalo Sánchez and Donny Meertens, Bandoleros, gamonales y campesinos (el 
caso de la violencia en Colombia) (Bogotá: El Áncora, 1983).
25. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Madrid, Legajo 2706, años 1854-1865. 
Carta de la delegación Española en Argentina al Consulado Español en Lisboa. 
No existe número de clasificación. Parte de un legajo titulado “Dirección de 
Asuntos Políticos”, agosto de 1864.
26. The New York Times [New York] 21 Jul. 1890: 2.
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Overpopulated public bureaucracies were, for many observers, another 
endemic problem of the new republics. In 1891, looking at Argentina in the 
midst of its economic bonanza, a British journalist reflected on the negative 
consequences of having too large a public sector: “(…) it is interesting to 
glance at the number of employees attached to the National Government 
(…) salaries and wages are 30% of the national revenue (…) staring to us 
in the face is evident that the provinces, with the exception of Entre Rios, 
cannot hope to meet their liabilities under the system of administration 
now in force (…) in Buenos Ayres (…) the revenue in 1882 was $12.805.336 
(…) of which 49% went to pay salaries and wages.”27 
What such images hide is that modernity is not only about order but 
most times also about chaos, war, conflict, unsettled politics, and lawless-
ness. They also dismissed the institutional and cultural novelty of the new 
societies. Lack of information, the strong influence of Anglo-American 
literature and the frustration of Latin American intellectuals with the back-
wardness of their countries, has fogged this picture. Not to mention the 
strongly rooted assumption that the colonial era negatively conditioned 
the capacity of the region to achieve high levels of development and social 
justice. In Local Histories, Global Designs, Walter Mignolo has argued that 
the most important reason for this neglect lies with historical Anglo/French 
literature.28 I would add that modernization, world-system, dependency, 
and international relations theories have made a huge contribution in this 
direction as well. The record of the region in terms of traditional indicators 
of modernity and development continues to be discouraging, even today. 
Yet this does not mean that the region could not create a modernity of its 
own that added to Western modernity in general. During the “first wave 
of globalization”, circa 1870-1920, a crucial time in the global proliferation 
of modernization and liberalism, regions of Latin America represented 
avant-garde modernity. 
Nations and Futures
Nation building in Latin America offers a correction to the existing 
(and huge) available literature on national identity, the nation-state, and 
27. The Times [London] 26 Jul. 26 1891: 1.
28. Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern 
Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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the nation.29 This literature has emphasized history and past collective ex-
periences as the binding element that creates a sense of belonging and thus 
constructs what Max Weber defined as a “community of sentiment”. In Latin 
America, however, history was weak, the past controversial, and sentiments 
of unity frail. Instead, ideas about the future of the nation seemed to pro-
vide a promising way to create identity. Unlike what happened in Europe, 
the nation could not be solely constructed upon a glorious past. The intel-
ligentsia and public figures, including politicians, struggled to create such 
a past. The result was a heated debate about the convenience of enhancing 
the indigenous, Spanish, Portuguese and colonial past of Latin America. A 
fresh, new start seemed more promising. And yet, the new Creole elite did 
not wholly agree as to the characteristics of this “new start”. One thing was 
clear: across the region Spanish and indigenous cultures were thought not 
to provide the desire foundations for the modern nation. Founding fathers 
became almost as important as in the u.s. and yet the strong rivalry that 
separated them and the almost permanent state of war of the nineteenth 
century made it difficult to built national identity exclusively upon their 
shoulders. 
Benedict Anderson writes that by the mid-nineteenth century “a model 
of the independent nation-state was available for pirating” and that this 
model was crafted in Latin America.30 This is correct. Yet this model included 
more than a reinterpretation of history and tradition. The conceptualization 
and construction of one of the factors of that equation, the nation, contained 
an equally important ingredient: an imagery of the future of the nation. 
29. To mention only some: see the famous 1189 lecture by Ernest Renan, “What 
is a Nation?”, Becoming National, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 41-55; Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: 
Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Eric 
Hobsbawam, “Inventing Tradition”, The Invention of Tradition, Eric Hobsbawm 
and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 1-14; 
John Luckacs, Democracy and Populism: Fear and Hatred (New Heaven: 
Yale University Press, 2005); Kohn, Hans, “The Nature of Nationalism”, The 
American Political Science Review 33.6 (1939): 1001-1021; Benedict R. Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983): and Under Three Flags: Anarchism and Anti-Colonial 
Imagination (London: Verso, 2005); Mandler; Yael Tamir, “The Enigma of 
Nationalism”, World Politics 47.3 (1992): 421-423, and see his Liberal Nationalism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
30. Anderson, Imagined Communities 81.
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States, intellectuals, the educational system, and politicians promoted im-
ages of its future in order to encourage identity and belonging. 
Across the region, rulers talked about a “proyecto nacional” or a “proyec-
to de nacion”; implicit in this idea was speculation about its future. As James 
Scott has claimed, states are, among other things, planners, and this involves 
specific notions of temporality, time, and space.31 His point is well taken: 
social engineering and systems of power distribution usually include images 
of what the future society would look like. The state “sees” the world in a 
particular way (as a state) creating a vision that obviously includes the future. 
Latin American republican states exercised this vision quite strongly.32 They 
envisioned the future of the national community in different ways according 
to contexts. They coincided, however, in the adoption of one model crafted 
upon liberal ideology: the combination of republicanism with the one state 
/one nation formulae.33 
Independence was, of course, a political event and cannot be equated 
with nation-building or with the actual existence of a nation. That took a 
longer time. Mexico has provoked one of the richest debates about the tim-
ing of nation building. Some have argued that at independence only the 
elites talked about the nation while the popular sectors knew little about its 
meaning or existence.34 Others, such as Florescano, suggested that indepen-
dence provided the opportunity for the unfolding of the idea of nation; it 
had existed but only in an embryonic stage in the colonial period. Lorenzo 
Meyer, on his part, has claimed that until the 1870s there was neither state 
nor nation in Mexico; this parallels similar arguments made about Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Alan Knight has distinguished 
31. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
32. As opposed to what the literature has argued, authoritarian states have not 
been the only ones that resort to this nation making tool. Lewis Siegel Baum 
and Andrei Sokolov, Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): and Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You Comrade 
Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001).
33. This model will be defined shortly below when discussing the notion of a 
nation-state as a symbol of modernity.
34. Eric Van Young, “The Raw and the Cooked: Elite and Popular Ideology in 
Mexico, 1800-1821”, The Middle Period in Latin America: Values and Attitudes 
in the Seventeenth-Nineteenth Centuries, ed. Mark Szuchman (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1989).
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between cultural nationalism, on the one hand, and nation building, on 
the other, an argument that, in different words, has also been made about 
Argentina and Uruguay. Timothy Anna has beautifully captured this debate 
in Mexico.35 
I find it significant that one can also find similar debates regarding the 
connection between nation and state elsewhere in the region. Anna is right 
in suggesting that the nation possesses an institutional component. Many 
others are also right to say that nationalism is political, ideological, and 
cultural. Yet the conceptualization and definition of the nation is different 
from nationalism and goes beyond institutions. The nation, to exist, needs 
to be somehow conceptualized, defined, and, imagined. Anderson stresses 
imagination, I stress conceptualization. Conceptualizing the nation includes 
not only symbolisms about the past but also of the future. 
In sum, the Latin American nation-state was, to a large extent, con-
structed upon the modern notion that the future of the national community 
is part of the definition of the nation. What does this mean as an analytical 
category? It can take many forms. It can refer to fate, predetermination, or 
religious mission as it did, for the most part, in the U. S. It can also include 
opaque prospects, damning the nation from its beginnings, as we know 
from Ancient Greece. It can also be based upon the “special” qualities of 
its people, as it has been said of England or France.36 Or it can reflect ex-
treme confidence in the “potential” of a given nation (human community) 
to achieve prosperity. Latin America contributed something different. Like 
the u.s., the region adopted Federalism as a basic political organization. 
Unlike the u.s., however, elites and government favored the “open-ended 
outcome” meaning of the word future rather than notions of destiny or fate.37 
“Destiny” sounded 1) too religious for most of the new republics that 
had been born ravaged by secular and religious struggles; 2) too Spanish; 
3) too connected to a past that elites wanted to redefine, and, especially, 4) 
too demanding. Destinies require definitions and compromise and usu-
ally build upon known traditions. In the region, elites found compromises 
threatening and traditions very controversial to define. 
35. See Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico: 1821-1835 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1989) 5-25.
36. See Mandler.
37. There were exceptions; for instance, Paraguay under J. Gaspar Francia and 
Venezuela under C. Castro and J. Vicente Gomez, although in the case of 
Venezuela, Federalism was a topic of debate from the beginning.
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Deprived of a sense of mission or destiny, the future of the nation in-
cluded a heavy dose of uncertainty. This is counterintuitive because we could 
assume that ideas about the future should be used to guarantee stability 
and encourage membership in the nation. Uncertainty seems to encour-
age the opposite. If one defines the nation as a community of horizontal 
solidarity, as Benedict Anderson does, uncertainty would diminish simply 
because members would be more prone to help each other as equal parts of 
the community and to collaborate for the common good. But the nation in 
Latin America was conceived hierarchically, rather than as a community of 
equals.38 Thus, while most elites manifested that the future looked bright, 
uncertainty was also ingrained into the very definition of the nation. From 
the standpoint of government, the good news was that they did not neces-
sarily have to take the entire blame when things went wrong. A tradition 
was forged by which authorities often charged the international market, 
the influence of powerful countries, and international pressures for the 
misfortunes of the nation. 
 Ethnicity, culture, and language are known factors that have contributed 
to identity. In the strong heterogeneity of Latin America none of these factors 
could have become the needed glue to construct identity. The future of the 
nation, however, provided a possible solution for the elites: all “races”, cul-
tures, and ethnicities —including immigrants— could feel similarly about 
the promise of a future that could be prosperous. The problem that elites 
and the state faced was to make the instrumentation of this conception of 
the nation possible, and to convince those who belonged to the “undesired” 
ethnicities and the poor in general that their “nation” would embrace them. 
This was not an easy task.
 Indeed, in many cases, the future of the nation predicted the eventual 
disappearance of unwanted ethnicities. The state took a leading role in the 
carving of the elites’ desired future for the nation, and, therefore, in the 
weakening of these undesired groups. It either looked the other way when 
local landholders or notables systematically marginalized or tried to elimi-
nate them or, as in Peru and Argentina, the state instrumented military 
38. Claudio Lomnitz, “Nationalism as a Practical System: Benedict Anderson’s 
Theory of Nationalism from the Vantage Point of Spanish America”, The Other 
Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America, eds. Miguel Ángel 
Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001) 329-359.
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campaigns to weaken indigenous communities and eliminate possible al-
ternative conceptions of “the nation”. Or as in twentieth century Mexico, 
it created encompassing categories such as “mestizo”,39 in order to try to 
blend a variety of cultures and ethnicities into one that would represent the 
“Mexican Nation”. In most cases, the Latin American states emerging in 
the nineteenth century favored the ideal of a more European/White nation 
encouraging miscegenation and/or the importing of immigrants from the 
desired “races” (Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia). Thus, 
the state took upon itself the construction of a nation, one nation, where 
ethnicities were supposed to fuse into a unifying entity. An emphasis on the 
future of the nation as a unifying factor, rather than a tradition created on 
a glorious past, seemed more appealing and useful to achieve these goals. 
Another republican experiment, the United States, also placed a strong em-
phasis on the future of the nation to both achieve unity and define the new 
nation. Yet it did so in a different way that differentiated North American 
modernity from that of Latin America. 
Two Paths to a Modern Nation:  
Latin America and the United States
In 1776, Thomas Paine exulted: “We have it in our power to begin the 
world over again”. After the French Revolution, he believed that France, too, 
had started a new era for the whole of humanity. He believed he had seen 
“government begin, as if we have lived at the beginning of time”.40 Hegel 
paid tribute to the United States of America by saying that it was a world 
historical phenomenon and that it represented “(...) the land of the future 
where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World’s History shall 
reveal itself”.41 The country itself was predicated upon the notion that the 
American nation represented a future of open possibilities and hope. In a dif-
ferent way, this modern conceptualization of the nation, as defined more by 
its future than by its past, was also present in the Latin American republics. 
39. Literature on Mexico has attributed the creation of the nation to such an 
alliance. See, among others, Luis Villoro, El proceso ideológico de la revolución 
de independencia (México: unam, 1983); and Ernesto de la Torre Villar, La 
Independencia mexicana, 3 vols. (México: fce, 1992).
40. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, the Rights of Man, reprint of 1791 edition (New 
York: Gryphon Editions, 1992) 58; and The Rights of Man (New York: Dolphin 
Books, 1961) 420.
41. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Willey Book Co., 1944) 86.
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In the United States, the awareness of having “founded” the first viable 
republic of modern times contributed to constructing a sense of national 
identity tied more to the future than to the past. One finds a similar situ-
ation in Latin America, although these republics no doubt knew that they 
were not the first and that the United States had walked a route that was 
not totally open for them. In Argentina, Uruguay and, to a great extent, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and Costa Rica, the state created definitions 
of “the nation” in which the openness of the future paralleled those that 
inspired the definition of the American nation. In both Americas, modern 
notions of the nation emerged that emphasized more the future than the 
past. In other words, in both Americas, members imagined and conceptu-
alized their nations through its future rather than its past. One can argue 
that this is the main modern novelty associated to the construction of the 
nation in the Americas. 
Some of the major differences between the United States and Latin 
America point to dissimilar expressions of modernity rather than to a 
“real” modern u.s. process of nation-building that would contrast with a 
pre-modern process of nation-building in underdeveloped Latin America. 
Modernity has been traditionally tied to the notion of “progress”. When 
defining “progress”, Sidney Pollard wrote that it was “the assumption than 
a pattern of change exists in the history of mankind (…) that consists in 
irreversible changes in one direction only, and that this direction is toward 
improvement”.42 As Pollard points out, material progress is a relatively recent 
notion of the last three hundred years or so, while moral progress, a concern 
of earlier times, has been mostly assumed to go along with the material. 
This depicts Latin American modernity and contributes to finding useful 
contrasts with the earlier modernization of the first republic. 
Material progress —framed by science, industry, and a profitable ex-
port economy— was in the minds of Latin American nation-makers. They 
thought that moral progress would follow. Unlike the u.s., no particular 
religious belief or eschatology was attached to this nineteenth century notion 
of progress as it made its way into the conceptualization of the nation. For 
Latin Americans, virtue, the will and capacity to put the public interest over 
the private, represented indeed a sign of civilization and modernity. Had 
not the Greeks spoken of political virtue and related it to the right polity? 
42. Sydney Pollard, The Idea of Progress: History and Society (London: ca Watts, 
1968) 9.
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Did not Plato think of republics as the embodiment of virtue? Yet most 
nation-builders, first and foremost, regarded the material basis of progress 
as the key prerequisite for modernity and, hopefully, a more virtuous polity. 
When these desired goals did not materialize, as was often the case, 
ruling elites and the emerging middle sectors blamed scarce manufactur-
ing, international markets, fraud, dependence, and the inefficiency of the 
agrarian sector for these failures. Scholars and public figures often argued 
that lack of economic progress hindered virtue, weakened institutions, and 
encouraged corruption, rather than the other way round. Here and there 
morals and values were mentioned as weak foundations and the cause of 
all evils. But most contemporaries focused on economics. 
We find something quite different in the United States, where “the poli-
tics of liberty” were associated much more with virtue than with economic 
development. Jefferson was adamant that manufacturing would be restricted 
because it generates much “subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of 
virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition”. Agriculture, con-
trastingly, was a generator of virtue.43 Modernity could represent both good 
and evil. He took an extreme position, but he was not alone. The American 
Revolution was a revolution about liberty —rather than about freedom— and 
it was framed by the politics of virtue. In fact, it was because the founders 
—especially in the Federalist Papers— thought that virtue was insufficient 
to maintain liberty that politics became necessary. The role of institutions 
was to provide a corrective to possible deviations from virtue. Left to their 
own impulses and affairs, men would very likely move away from virtue. 
Following Montesquieu, the anti-Federalists stressed the size of the 
community and believed that virtuous people could live only in a republic 
that was small, predominantly agrarian, and homogeneous. Madison dis-
agreed. He thought that a republic could be sustained in a larger territory. 
In this debate, the Federalists prevailed. Their thinking was that a larger 
republic could also achieve moral sustainability. The Federalists argued 
that the state was to encourage commerce and enlarge the republic foster-
ing a “multiplicity” and “diversity” of interests together with the parties 
representing such interests. Echoing Hume and Adam Smith, —but un-
like Jefferson— the Federalists looked upon an expansive economy as the 
condition for moral self-betterment. Yet, in the matter of virtue and ethics, 
43. Thomas Jefferson, Writings, ed. Merrill D Peterson (New York: Library of 
America, 1984) Notes on Virginia.
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they also took Montesquieu to heart, and crafted their conception of the 
American nation upon ethical principles. 
This was not naïve. They felt that the role of republican institutions was 
to ensure that liberty and virtue prevailed. Men were not to be trusted to 
spontaneously sustain the kind of needed virtue to run a healthy nation; 
thus, institutions were needed to prevent corruption and preserve the future 
of the Union. 
This conveys a different version of the role of institutions from the one 
that more than a century later will dominate Latin America. Institutions 
seemed to play a similar role in both, but in Latin America, religion, in-
stitutions, and liberty, did not participate equally in the conceptualization 
of the nation. In the United States, they did. One could claim that this 
eighteenth century North American notion of modernity and the nation 
was less “modern” than the Latin American ones that prevailed later on in 
the nineteenth. Was North American modernity anti-capitalist? Neither 
of these assumptions would be true. In the United States, virtue, religion, 
and material development were seen as complementary sides of modernity. 
This was an implicit assumption that did not get written in the Consti-
tution. As in Latin America, neither virtue nor religion was mentioned 
in the founding Constitutional document. As opposed to Latin America, 
however, religion, the real philosophical foundation of virtue, in tandem 
with liberty, constituted the basic ingredients of the American nation and 
its future development. 
In the United States, the role of the state was different. Government was 
there only to promote and guarantee liberty, since the “American nation” 
was believed to have pre-existed the state.44 In Latin America, contrast-
ingly, the nation was conceived as a secular product. In the United States, 
religion and virtue did not constitute the objects of government because 
they would spontaneously emerge from the “natural impulses” of society. 
Society was, after all, the infrastructure of government. In Latin America, 
these impulses were not considered “natural” and the state needed to have 
a role in shaping them. 
Indeed, the strong liberal/clerical cleavage that characterized the con-
ceptualization of the nation and state-building in Latin America did not 
make much sense in the u.s. Religion in the United States did not need to 
44. See an interpretation of the American nation as pre-existing the Union in 
Greenfeld.
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be in the Constitution because it was believed to be firmly embedded in 
society. Religion in Latin America did not need to be in the Constitutions 
because the government’s role was to keep Church and state separate. 
When religion was mentioned, it was precisely to make that point. Latin 
America comes closer to the French tradition that saw the role of religion 
very differently and thus conceived “the nation” and its future in very 
different way. 
When writing about America half a century after the establishment of 
the first Republic, Tocqueville, from a French perspective, offered an analysis 
that facilitates comparison with the Latin American republics. The French 
philosophers, he wrote, thought “religious zeal …will be extinguished as 
freedom and enlightenment increase”. The United States disproved that 
theory. What surprised Tocqueville was that “among us (he meant the 
French) I had seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom almost 
always moved in contrary directions. Here I found them united with one 
another; they reigned together in the same soil.”45 Definitely, Latin America 
came closer to France than to the u.s. And yet it was different from France 
in that its construction of the nation, as in the United States, stressed more 
a projection into the future than into the past.
In sum, what were the major differences between the u.s. and Latin 
America in terms of how they conceived the future of the nation? First, 
the fact that nation in Latin America was conceived as a secular modern 
construct had implications for the way in which Latin Americans conceived 
of its future. In the u.s., notions of the end of history were associated, in 
part, with the conceptualization of the nation, and this sharply differenti-
ated the two Americas.46 From the standpoint of civil religion, many of 
those who began the so-called “American experiment” conceived of it as 
45. Alexis Tocqueville, Democracy in America, electronic edition deposited and 
marked-up by asgrp, the American Studies Programs at the University of 
Virginia, June 1, 1997, 408-410. From the Henry Reeve Translation revised and 
corrected, 1899.
46. It can be argued that by the time of Alexander Hamilton and in 1801, when 
Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency of the United States, the u.s. was not 
a nation yet. After that time, the state did expand and the federal government 
crafted a notion of the nation that featured openness and opportunity. Yet early 
religious utopian notions never ceased to exist in the popular imaginary and in 
the minds of most state-makers during the process of nation-building. 
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an eschatological society, almost as a realized utopia.47 It is worth quot-
ing Bellah at this point: “An axial critique of the fundamental premises 
of American society and culture would require not only a critique of …
individualism and its strange complementarity with the confusion of God 
and nation, but a critique of the Protestant Reformation itself, at least its 
most influential American forms. Such critique would show that the United 
States is not the City of God that it claims to be…The great Protestant mis-
take —into which Catholics have at times fallen— was to confuse religion 
and nation, to imagine that America had become a realized eschatology. 
Our participation in the great wars of the twentieth century only confirmed 
our sense of ourselves as beyond history, uniquely chosen in the world to 
defend the children of light against the children of darkness.”48 
Second, and as a consequence of this strong religious influence, u.s. citi-
zens, for centuries, believed they were special and different, chosen by God 
to play a redemptive and unique role in the world.49 In its more exaggerated 
versions, nation-building combined with eschatology to produce a distinct 
mixture that included a strong faith in a possible rupture, not to mention 
the countdown to Christ’s return to the chosen land.50 These notions are 
alien to the imagining of the Latin American nation. 
Third, the relation between the state and the nation was different in 
these two waves of republicanism.51 
Fourth, in Latin America, the notion of “a national future” in connection 
with the definition of the nation was conceived in terms of open possibili-
ties. From the beginning, a sense of uncertainty formed part of the Latin 
American imagery of the future. This therefore opened the door for possible 
47. See, among others, Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America”, Daedalus 117.3 
(1988): 97-118.
48. Robert Bellah, “Meaning and Modernity: America in the World”, Meaning and 
Modernity: Religion, Polity, and Self, eds. Richard Madsen; William Sullivan; 
Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002) 266
49. For a straight forward discussion on this issue, see Kevin Phillips, American 
Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money 
in the 21st Century (New York: Viking Press, 2006) 125-170.
50. Pat Robertson, America’s Dates with Destiny (Nashville: Thomas Nelson 
Publishers, 1986).
51. Robertson 99-170; 219-269.
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negative outcomes that became ingrained in the definition of the nation. In 
the United States we find a very different situation.
Fifth, these differences about how the future of the nation was con-
ceived connect with different degrees of perceived exceptionality and the 
acceptance of foreign influences. It has often been pointed out that an “es-
sential” part of American national identity is to believe that the u.s. stands 
as an exception and a unique social and political experiment. The United 
States, it has been argued, “is based on difference, on a tendency to define 
America as distinct from, even separate from, all that is foreign (…).”52 
Republicanism and Protestantism were regarded as major features of this 
distinctiveness and uniqueness. This went hand in hand with a rejection of 
“all that was foreign”. Thus, Washington’s warning about “entangling alli-
ances” with foreign powers that could jeopardize, among other things, the 
new Republic’s destiny and mission. 
Nothing can be more different from the foundations upon which Latin 
American republics created their conceptions of what was “national”. In a 
situation of neocolonialism, state-makers and the intelligentsia also tried to 
guard the country from dangerous foreign influence. Nevertheless, under 
very strong global pressures the new republics were encouraged to search 
for mirrors and foreign inspiration. As a result, they ended up looking more 
outwards than inwards, embracing foreign ways and cultures. 
Immigrant communities added to these influences. The rejection of 
Spanish traditions after the wars of independence was traumatizing. It 
pressed intellectuals and governments to look elsewhere, to indigenous 
traditions but even more so to North America and Europe. Even in Bra-
zil, which did not experience a struggle for independence and acquired 
it under the watch of a Prince, the search for identity also meant a turn 
toward Europe in general rather than exclusively to Portugal. Brazilian 
intellectuals of the nineteenth century looked to France for philosophi-
cal guidance and to England for models of parliamentary government. 
Germany was expected to contribute metaphysics and technology. In Ar-
gentina, the same was true.53 
52. Thomas Bender, “The American Way of Empire”, World Policy Journal xxiii.1 
(Spring, 2006): 45.
53. Germany also contributed something else: military training. Considered to 
possess the top military academies in the world, Germany received Argentine 
cadets. La Prensa reported in 1905 that the government “(…) en vez de contratar 
militares de Alemania (…) ha resuelto enviar militares argentinos a estudiar 
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Finally, what about the sense of manifest destiny that formed such 
an important part of the definition of the nation in the United States? 
Was it also present in Latin America? Argentina and Uruguay and to 
an extent other countries such as Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, and Colombia 
shared a very mild sense of manifest destiny in their unshakable faith in 
their natural resources and a future of prosperity. Brazilians definitely 
thought that their nation had a bright and promising future. However, 
Latin American nation-building fell quite short of a sense of manifest des-
tiny. On an international scale of the use of manifest destinies in terms of 
the definition of the nation, Argentina and much of Latin America would 
lie at one extreme of the spectrum. The United States would follow in a 
sort of middle position. On the other extreme of the spectrum one could 
find, for instance, Germany, which at certain times in its history, spoke 
often of the grandeur of the German people and its destiny to dominate 
Europe and the world. 
One can argue that in their quest for modernity, nineteenth century 
Latin American republics knew that their nations were in turmoil but in 
a lot of ways they also saw them as privileged and deserving of a bright 
future. Elites, intellectuals, and the state assigned a sort of independent 
entity status to the nation. They felt that the nation needed to be in per-
manent alert; otherwise, men could lead it into the wrong direction, es-
pecially public officials and institutions. Strong disagreement as to the 
historical foundations of the desired nation opened the door for serious 
considerations of its present and its future. Spain could not provide an 
adequate foundation. Here is another difference with the United States. 
In the North American Republic, the institutions and morals of the ex-
colonizer were accepted as part of the new nation. In the America of the 
future that John Adams described as an “empire of liberty” comprising 
“twenty of thirty million of freemen without one noble or one king among 
them”, Tudor Law remained strong and accepted, as well as British phi-
losophy and commercial culture. Indeed, the British idea that the public 
good rested on social virtues became ingrained into the imagining of 
the American nation. One can argue that the United States experienced 
a process closer to introspection than to an outward-looking conception 
of the nation.
y practicar en el ejercito de aquella nación que conserva y conservara la 
supremacía militar en Europa”. La Prensa [Buenos Aires] 24 Sep. 1905: 2.
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 Conclusions
I have tried to show the nuances and characteristics of modernity in a 
post-colonial context in the hope of contributing to our understanding of 
modernity. For too long, modernity has been exclusively conceived as the 
creation and product of the advanced capitalist nations. We have shown 
that the conception and practice of nation-building, the nation state, and 
national identity do not actually fit that definition. Modernity, in the com-
plex context of postcolonial Latin America was, in a sense, more open to 
foreign influence, ambitious in its social engineering, and in many ways 
more radical in its adoption of liberal and republican institutional models 
than Europe. It cannot be fully understood as a mere reaction, imitation, or 
consequence of developments in Europe or the United States. The way that 
the state, elites, and the lower strata of the population implemented their 
modernity remains a contribution of their own. 
As Latin American marks of modernity, this paper has stressed the 
adoption of the one state-one nation model, the simultaneous formation of 
republican rule, the state and national identity, and definitions of the nation 
that included imaginings of open futures and uncertainty. Literature has 
identified some of these developments as defining moments of European 
modernity from the sixteenth century onwards. In Latin America, moder-
nity took its own form and roots, especially in regard to those developments. 
Obviously, the conceptualization of the nation in the terms just described 
incorporated and imported European and North American modern notions 
of the state, civil society, institutions, and identity. Yet Latin American mo-
dernity and innovation in institutional design and nation-building cannot 
be fully understood by looking at these indicators alone. 
Latin American modernizers believed, as will many socialist and Marx-
ist governments and movements of the twentieth century that social en-
gineering was not only possible but also desirable, and that government 
could and should craft the desired type of nation. Nineteenth century Latin 
American modernizers took to heart the modern nineteenth century idea 
that material development determined pretty much everything else, in-
cluding morals. It was also based on the conviction that race, values, and 
“civilization” also needed to be part of the ingredients needed to construct 
the “right nation”. This conviction was also present in the United States, 
but in the context of a different relation between liberty, virtue, and the 
institutions of the state. 
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